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PAUL, POMO, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF
CHOICE POST 9/11: A BRIEF COMMENT ON
THREE PAPERS
Richard H. Weisberg*

"Ideas have consequences, or else why would people like Mr. Fish
feel so strongly about them?"^
"At least in one place, Fish (like Badiou) uses Pauline Christianity
to elaborate what he terms (unlike Badiou) 'the post-modem lesson'
that the story we humans enact 'is underwritten by nothing firmer or
more 'objective' (independent) than the inner conviction of those
who live it out.
"1 wish to conclude with a very short consideration of the struggle
between the weak thought of postmodernist discourse and the heavy
rhetoric of fundamentalism. It is a mistake to erect these alternatives
into sheer opposites. The 'darkness' of fundamentalism is often
supported by a claim that Scripture has a univocal kind of
transparency, and the 'lightness' of postmodern thought, while
promoting a maximum of political openness, insists on the darkness
(nontransparency) of texts.

My prerogative and pleasure as co-convenor of this
Conference are to comment (briefly) on just one set of stimulating
papers, those given on the "Postmodernism" panel. For years—
beginning really with my graduate student days "under" Paul de
* Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center
for Constitutional Democracy, Benjsimin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
' Edward Rothstein, Porno at War, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1605,1608 (2003).
2 Steven Mailloux, Contingent Universals: Religious Fundamentalism, Academic
Postmodernism, and Public Intellectuals in the Aftermath of September 11,24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1583,1600-01 (2003).
3 Geoffrey
Hartman,
Transparency
Reconsidered:
On
Postmodernism,
Fundamentalism, and Other Dark Matters, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
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Man and Geoffrey Hartman himself—^my own work has also
touched on the limits to principled decision-making apparently
laid down by various postmodernisms;" so the excellent
contributions here of Hartman, Mailloux, and Rothstein made me
think in a post-9/11 context of what has always already enhvened
the resistance of classical thinking on the apparent innovations of
the "pomos."
I say "apparent" because these three papers reveal some
salient similarities of thought, if not necessarily of expressioij.
Rothstein correctly situates pomo within a broad classical tradition
that permits the very tolerance that may produce "relativism."
After all, the twentieth century's onset in Einstein and Freud
established long before Derrida the uncertainty—^Hartman might
call it the "hermeneutic perplexity"—^both of the cosmos and the
individual human mind. Mailloux helpfully moves pomo towards
this traditionalism by convincingly challenging Stanley Fish's
assertion that there is no practical effect of a theory that
everywhere seeks to deny even the possibihty of principled
decision-making. And Hartman, whose superb paper otherwise
evokes much of his earlier writing,^ situates Gianni Vattimo along
a spectrum of thinkers who, although denying any transparency of
the real in a complex world, nonetheless see "ethical life and
historicality coinciding]... as an event of destiny."
All three writers concur in Vattimo's suggestion that, as
Hartman puts it, "[t]he risk of blankness or hermeneutic perplexity
is not sustained."® Human beings, against all the odds, prefer to a
pervasive system of doubt at least some form of certainty. For
Fish, as convincingly re-interpreted through Mailloux, there must
be a certainty precisely of the uncertainty of all interpretive acts.
The absence of a principled basis for decision-making becomes, for
some pomos, a fighting faith. Theory affects practice, as decision
makers deny "indubitable proof" as Rothstein puts it, in favor of
"power or reward or rhetoric." I have recently attempted to show
that Fish falls back on the "principle" of the guild'^ some
'' See, e.g., Richard Weisberg, On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modem
Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC
READER 181-92 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988), reprinted and
expanded from Richard Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the
Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. 939 (1986). More recently, see Richard H. Weisberg, Fish
Takes the Bait: Holocaust Denial and Postmodernist Theory, 43 CRITICAL QUARTERLY
19-27 (Winter 2001) [hereinafter Weisberg, Fish Takes the Bait\, reprinted and revised in
14 CARD. STUD. L. & LIT. 131 (2002).
5 See, e.g., GEOFFREY HARTMAN, THE LONGEST SHADOW: IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
® Hartman, supra note 3.
' Weisberg, Fish Takes the Bait, supra note 4.
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postmodemisms merely internalize the power structure as the
basis of all decision-making, and in so doing render themselves
more rehant on externalities than those they attack for trying to
rely on principle.
Take, precisely, the debate about the events of 9/11 and the
nation's appropriate response to them. One side (say, Rothstein's)
wants to name, to take responsibility for a judgment that calls
certain actors bad and thus certain responses justifiable. The other
side (say, Mailloux's) wants to be more reflective about that act of
naming—^wants to understand the "rhetorical paths of thought in
the public sphere" that lead people to make such judgments; he
may be far less willing than Rothstein to take a firm position
within the developing discourse. In this sense, Hartman's very
different, continentally oriented essay, helps clarify the reluctance
to speak bluntly:
Thus, in terms of intellectual history, postmodern critics battle
the idea of decadence once more, attacking specifically its
origin in retrospectively gilded fantasies of total social cohesion.
But can we manage without a vocabulary of rise and fall?®
Hartman's reluctance to call things by a specific name
pervades his entire theoretical oeuvre. But, unlike Fish, he does
not turn this rhetorical equivocation into a fighting faith; more
importantly, he accepts the implications within his own style of an
aversion to an absolutist vocabulary. For Hartman, World War II
and (Hitler's) grotesque use of just such a clear rhetoric of naming
places on postmodems an almost ethical responsibility to "limit the
totahtarian temptation to use language and reason only
instrumentally." To avoid the hideous repetition of dictatorial
rhetoric, we must seek "recognition and intertextual density"
rather than the directness of judgmental speech.
I feel much more attuned to Hartman's explanation than to
Fish's, and thus I welcome Mailloux's elaboration of Fish's un-selfreflective theoretics. Our approach to public rhetoric does have
consequences—^if we are trained to distrust principle, we are far
less likely to act in accordance with even our most deeply held
convictions; but what if (as in Hartman) the imbedded principle is,
precisely, to avoid doing ultimate harm to others by repeating a
version of absolute conviction that recent history compels us to
avoid?
Here I would intervene, as I did with Fish, wearing my hat as
an historian of the Holocaust.' Studies of the discourse in Hitler's
Europe have revealed a more complex rhetorical pattern than the
^ Hartman, supra note 3, at 1574.
' See RICHARD WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
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usually complex Hartman assumes in his ethical desire to avoid
simplistic speech. France found itself able to traduce all of its
egalitarian values only through an extraordinarily textured effort of
discursive flexibility. In much of Europe, and certainly in Vichy,
people needed to be complex (not simplistic) to pump themselves
towards a vicious racism that their engrained egalitarianism
otherwise would have rejected.
Once we posit a different premise from Hartman's—once we
find that Hitler's Europe moved towards the unthinkable not
because of a knee-jerk response to totalizing rhetoric, but instead
through a complex process of discursive rationalization and
change—^we must question Hartman's otherwise admirable project
of theorizing verbal complexity. What was needed during Vichy
was what Rothstein now proposes post 9/11: calling things by their
proper names, and taking responsibihty for our own "vocabulary
of rise and fall."
Rothstein asks, "why should there be no way to definitively
judge" the attack on the World Trade Center or any other such
situation, but neither Mailloux nor Hartman, as we have seen,
primarily directs his skepticism to any act of judgment. We all
make judgments; to be avoided by pomo, instead, is on one hand
the fallacy of making your judgment into a universal applicable to
those you are judging, and on the other to pronounce emphatically
your judgment knowing full well, because of history, that emphatic
judgments pronounced on others can double back to victimize you
and those you value.
In the end, it all may come down to our manner of
interpreting experience, whether we are looking at a text (like the
Bible) or an event (like 9/11). Pomo seeks the maximum of
complexity in this business of interpreting; the more classical
vision from someone like Rothstein wants to conclude, not at all
thoughtlessly, but based on an acquired and ultimately far more
direct sense of right and wrong. But, if we place the Bible and 9/11
side by side—as Mailloux does by bringing in Pauline Christianity
towards the end of his paper—^we again find more agreement than
argument between the two sides.
Mailloux for the pomos concedes here that truth, although
"not a proposition that corresponds to a pre-existing state of
affairs... is something that happens and must be maintained."
Saint Paul did name (as Rothstein wants us to do now). He called
Jesus the Messiah, and this was absolute good; Rothstein wants us
to call those who perpetrated 9/11 absolute evil. Those acts of
naming are normatively not justified by any prior "objective"
proof: Rothstein agrees early in his paper that we have no such
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proofs about the cast of characters in 9/11, yet "wc judge [this
being] the best that we can do [and] often something that we must
do." Similarly, even if Saint Paul's efforts to ground his message in
some Old Testament "proof" or prophecy were hopelessly skewed
and interpretively dishonest,^" truth nonetheless emerges in Paul
from "the product of truth procedures that are initiated by the
naming of an event that emerges in a situation."
Both of these seemingly antagonistic writers agree, finally,
that people's positions, their judgments, their words, emerge
largely from a non-universal and yet knowable originating
moment, a departure from which all subsequent judgments may be
made as to their "truth" or "falsity"; and this identifying of a
moment of resolution—not so different from Vattimo's "event of
destiny" as described (but not necessarily accepted) by Hartman—
binds the individual and perhaps his interpretive community from
then on to its verisimilitude.
I close with what for me is the curious and fascinating
phenomenon of the pomo Mailloux leaping over the neo-classicist
Rothstein to find his source in a Hellenic theological genius (Saint
Paul), a source probably foreign to the thinking of the thoroughly
secularized New York Times columnist. But then, I have been
writing for years about the irony that deconstructionism originates
in the Gospel writers." Their "truth" was, precisely, that no text—
however long-standing and sacred its interpreters' understanding
of it may be—^is impervious to new readings that may, without
erasing it entirely, upset its basic meaning. Whether such a
methodology is good or bad is a subject for another day;" that it
has led to hermeneutic distortion throughout several millennia of
western culture seems clear.

10 The most forceful antagonism to the textual distortions needed to make the Old
Testament a predictor of the New comes of course from Nietzsche, most keenly in The
Dawn of Day, aphorism 84. For a milder re-iteration of this point by a Christian
theologian, see, e.g., GEORGE M. SMIGA, PAIN AND POLEMIC: ANTI-JUDAISM IN THE
GOSPELS (1992).
11 See Weisberg, supra note 4.
" For a recent excellent discussion of the connections among pomo, religious
hermeneutics, and infinitely flexible readings of texts, see Peter Goodrich, Europe in
America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of Transformation, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 2033,2065 (2001).

